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INTRODUCTION
As courts and commentators puzzle over the implications of the
Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller 1 and

* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati
College of Law. I am deeply indebted to the following for helping me shepherd this
project to completion: Deborah Brake, Joanna Grossman, Emily Houh, Kristin
Kalsem, Darrell A.H. Miller, and Sandra Sperino. I also would like to thank
participants in workshops at the University of Cincinnati and the Ninth Annual
Lutie Lytle Conference at Vanderbilt University Law School where I presented
versions of this paper. Research assistance from David Lopez-Kurtz, Kelsi Steele,
and Candice Thomas was indispensable. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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McDonald v. Chicago,2 which held that the Second Amendment
protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, 3 mass and public
shootings continue to rise. 4 In 2015 alone they erupted in such
diverse locations as a state health department,5 community college,6
movie theater,7 and a church.8 Yet, as the public discourse about gun
rights escalates in urgency and tone, surprisingly few feminist legal
scholars have intervened.9 Why not?

2. 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment applies to
the states).
3. In HeUer, the Court observed that the right is not subject to a "freestanding,
interest-balancing approach," but "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of
firearms" nonetheless may apply. 554 U.S. at 626, 634 (referring to existing
proscriptions against owning or possessing guns).
4. Mark Follman, Yes, Mass Shootings are Occurring More Often, MOTHER
JONES (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/10/mass-shootings
rising-harvard; see also DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A
STUDY OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND
2013 8 (Sept. 16, 2013), (https://www.tbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study
2000-2013-1.pdf) (finding that in the first half of the years studied, the average
annual number of incidents was 6.4, which increased in the second half of the study
to 16.4 or, on average, more than one incident per month).
5. Marina Koren, The Potential Terrorism Behind the San Bernardino
Shooting,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Dec.
5,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/12
/san-bernardino-shooting-tbi
isis/ 419001/ (reporting on the mass shooting at the Inland Regional Center, where
the state public health department held its holiday party).
6. Joseph Hoyt, Mark Berman & Jerry Markon, Nine Victims and Gunman
Dead in Mass Shooting at Ore. Community College, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/multiple-fatalities-reported-in-shooting-at
oregon-community-college/2015/ 10/01/b9e9cc4c-686c-1 le5-9ef3
fde 182507eac_story.html.
7. Ashley Cusick, Sarah Kaplan & Elahe lzadi, 'Slow and methodical':
Officials Describe Deadly La. Theater Shooting, WASH. POST (July 24, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/07/23/gunman-opens
fire-on-la-movie-theater-injuring-several-before-killing-himself/?tid=a_inl.
8. Eleanor Randolph, The Murders at Mother Emanuel Church in Charleston,
NY
TIMES:TAKING
NOTE
(June
18,
2015,
2:49
PM),
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/
2015/06/18/the-murders-at-mother-emanuel
church-in-charleston/.
9. &e, e.g., Lindsay K Charles, Feminists and Firearms: Why are So Many
Women Anti-Choice?, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 297 (2011); Allana Bassin, Why
Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 351 (1997);
Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun
Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97 (1997); Inge Anna Larish, Why Annie Can't Get Her
Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the &cond Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. F. 467 (1996);
Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, Do Battered Women Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 11 YALE L.
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After all, violence is a particular concern for women, as polling
data indicate.IO Too many women confront firearms at the hands of
batterers.11 Their children are at risk of dramatically shortened
lifespans due to accidental and intentional shootings.12 Moreover,
gun ownership in this nation is highly gendered-according to the
Pew Research Center, men are three times more likely to own a
firearm than are women. 13 Gun ownership also is highly racialized;
the same survey reported that 82% of gun owners were white
males.14 According to the Department of Justice, deaths by firearms
are racialized and gendered: the rate of homicide by firearms for
blacks in 2010 was 14.6 per 100,000, compared to 1.9 for whites; for
men, the rate was 6.2 per 100,000, versus 1.1 for women.15 Recently,
the African American Policy Forum--of which critical race feminist
scholar Kimberle Crenshaw is the Executive Director-publicly
urged feminists to speak out against racist violence in the wake of
the Charleston massacre in which nine churchgoers were gunned

& POL'Y REV. 509 (1993); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the
Bill of ''Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Cm. L. REV. 453, 494-503 (1992).
10. See, e.g., MS. FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN, A FRESH LoOK AT THE PU13LIC'S
VIEW TOWARD EQUALITY, COMMUNITY ISSUES, AND SOLUTIONS 12-13 (2015),
http://forwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Ms-National-Survey-Executive
Summary.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Vanessa Farr, Henry Myrttinen & Albrecht Schnabel, Sexing the
Pistol: The Gendered Impacts of Prolific Small Arms, in SEXED PISTOLS: THE
GENDERED IMPACTS OF SMALL ARMs AND LIGHT WEAPONS 4 (Vanessa Farr, Henri
Myrttinen & Albrecht Schnabel, eds. 2009) (observing the absence of gender in
discourse about firearms, in addition to the lack of data and research on the
gendered aspects of gun use and abuse).
12. John M. Leventhal, Julie Gaither & Robert Sege, Hospitalizations Due to
Firearm Injuries in Children and Adolescents, 133 PEDIATRICS 219 (Feb. 4, 2004).
13 Why Own a Gun? Protection is Now Top Reason, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 16
(Mar.
12,
2013),
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/03-12
13%20Gun%200wner ship%20Release.pdf (reporting that men 37% of men surveyed
owned guns, compared to 12% of women).
14. Id.at17.
15. Michael Planty & Jennifer L. Truman, Firearm Violence, 1993-2011,
BUREAU
OF
JUSTICE
STATISTICS
(May
2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311. pdf.
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down. 16 In the popular press, Dani McClain, a writer for The Nation,
has urged that gun violence is a matter of reproductive justice.17
If any subject were ripe for a feminist analysis, it is the Second
Amendment. Martha Chamallas has explained that feminism is
suspicious of the status quo and questions what lurks beneath
current conditions to uncover oppression. 18 In addition, because
feminist legal methods are intentionally contextual and
intersectional, as explained below, they help "smoke out" gender in
ostensibly neutral places.
This article accepts Crenshaw and McClain's invitation and uses
a recent move on the part of feminist legal advocates-social justice
feminism ("SJF')--to explore the contours of the Second
Amendment. As discussed more fully below, SJF resulted from
practitioners' frustration with the failure of the modern women's
movement to address fully the concerns of women at the margins of
privilege---e.g., women of color, low-income women-and its lack of
traction in a negative political environment. 19 Building upon the
various women's movements that came before, SJF illuminates
structural barriers to equality that may not appear at first blush to
implicate gender.20
Because SJF analyzes legal issues in context by examining their
history, the interconnection of oppressions, as well as their impact
on marginalized people, viewing the Second Amendment through its
lens highlights the gendered and racialized aspects of the right to
keep and bear arms. The historical analysis that SJF provides
demonstrates the role the Second Amendment has played in
constructing race and gender from the time of the founding. The
framers drafted the Amendment against a legal backdrop that
construed the term "citizen" as male and white. By the

The Charleston Imperative: Why Feminism & Antiracism Must Be Linked,
2015), http://www.aapf.org/recent
/201517/charleston. As a matter of full disclosure, I am one of the signatories to that
letter.
17. Dani McClain, The Murder of Black Youth Is a Reproductive Justice Issue,
THE NATION (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/murder-black-youth
reproductive-justice-issue/.
18. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 3 (3d ed.
2013).
19. Id. at 133-34.
20. Articulating methods highlights what is occurring in order to enhance it
going forward. Id. at 175, (citing Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103
HARV. L. REV. 829, 836 (1990) (observing that such methods seek to "reveal features
of a legal issue that more traditional methods tend to overlook or suppress'')).
16.

AFRICAN AMERICAN POLICY FORUM (July 7,
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Reconstruction era, congressional enactments expanded that term to
include Black21 men, but white Southerners responded violently,
seeking to restore that status to its antebellum meaning and the
white patriarchal order it augured. In this connection, feminist legal
theory, specifically SJF, reveals that the Second Amendment and
attendant societal understandings of the right to keep and bear arms
played a role in establishing and reproducing white male dominance.
Understood in this way, the Court's decisions in Heller and
McDonald reinforce structural oppression under the guise of
promoting individual rights.
To make that case, this article proceeds in four parts. Part I
briefly addresses the question of why a feminist lens is useful in this
context, with a focus on SJF to set the stage for the analysis that
follows. Because SJF examines the historical underpinnings of
practices to determine whether and how they contribute to
subordinating structures, this article follows in the footsteps of
Heller and McDonald by focusing on the history of the Second
Amendment, identifying aspects of history that the Court elided. In
this connection, Part II reviews the Ratification Era, while Part III
explores
Reconstruction,
broadly
speaking.
The
Second
Amendment's past suggests that, rather than providing for merely a
collective or individual right to bear arms, as the majority and
dissenting Justices in Heller debated, the Amendment also served
structural purposes. More specifically, the framers drafted the
Amendment to allay fears of tyranny emanating from a strong
centralized government and, in so doing, constructed the notion of
"citizen" as white and male. Some ninety years later, framers of the
Reconstruction Amendments had similar ends in mind. However,
the target was tyranny at the hands of the states. The framers thus
sought to fold newly freed slaves into the definition of "citizen," as
well as to protect the radical new social order represented and
supported by fledgling Republican state governments. In this
context, state militias, which the Amendment protects, highlighted
the significance of masculinity in defining "citizen," as well as the
primacy of race in defining manhood. Part IV then concludes by
suggesting the implications for this expanded understanding of the
Second Amendment, looking specifically at Stand Your Ground laws.

21. "Black" and "African American" suggest a "specific culture group, and, as
such, require denotation as a proper noun." Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation, and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988).
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I. WHY A FEMINIST LENS?
Feminist legal theory ("FLT'') is a powerful tool for exannmng
the Second Amendment because of its innate skepticism about the
status quo, its emphasis on context, and its recognition that
intersecting oppressions are especially relevant in analyzing a given
policy or practice. In brief, FLT examines ''how gender has mattered
to the development of the law and how different groups of men and
women are differentially affected by the power of law." 22 In so doing,
FLT critiques legal doctrines to uncover hidden biases, identify how
male supremacy is reproduced, and give voice to those who
experience oppression at the intersections of sex, race, and class,
among other things.23 FLT is oriented toward making change; it
leans toward inclusivity and collective solutions. Additionally, FLT
questions the existence of a formal public/private divide and is open
to state involvement to address societal wrongs.24 Given the
frequency and scope of gun violence in women's lives, the hostile
resistance in many corners to any type of gun regulation, and the
growing insistence on firearm ownership as a means of public safety,
a feminist analysis of the Second Amendment right is essential to
comprehending what is at stake in this highly charged debate.
SJF, a recently articulated strand of feminist legal theory, is
particularly apt in this context because it reaffirms feminist ideals of
focusing on under-served communities. The term "social justice
feminism" emerged from feminist legal advocates in response to calls
from women of color and other marginalized women seeking greater
progress on issues affecting them, particularly violence.25 SJF builds

22. CHAMALLAS, supra note 18, at xxi.
23. Id. at 6-13.
24. NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 8-12
(2006).
25. Kristen Kalsem & Verna L. Williams, Social Justice Feminism, 18 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 131, 133, 187 (2010). At a series of meetings designed to revitalize
the movement, particularly for marginalized women, attendee Linda Burnham
observed that the "feminist project, while not completely stalled, does not have the
kind of political traction it needs to effectively influence public policy and improve
the lives of women." Id. at 134. In addition, research by the National Association for
the Advancement of Women found that women of color were more likely to consider
themselves feminists than their white counterparts. These women expressed a desire
for a women's movement that addressed issues mainstream feminism had neglected.
Primary among those issues was violence. To move this conversation forward, Astrea
Lesbian Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Ms. Foundation for Women
funded meetings of feminist activists from a variety of settings to consider where and
how the feminist movement could be more inclusive and effective in addressing
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upon the various waves of feminism, reinforcing its original mission
and expanding its reach. Specifically, SJF "strives to uncover and
dismantle [social and political structures that support patriarchy],26
while "recognizing and addressing multiple oppressions." 27 Martha
Chamallas has suggested that SJF is "a new take on
intersectionality theory and intersectional feminism."28 Given its
genesis among practitioners, SJF embodies three core methodologies
that "attempt to reveal features of a legal issue that more traditional
methods tend to overlook or suppress:"29
One method, looking to history to understand subordinating
structures, seeks to acquire more knowledge with which to
understand and then dismantle the bases of societal
institutions that perpetuate hierarchies and inequities.
Another method, examining the inter-relationships between
interlocking oppressions, asks how issues of gender, race,
class, and other categories of identity and experiences work
together to create social injustice. A third method, ensuring
that principles of dismantling interlocking oppressions
inform solutions, keeps the focus on bottom-up strategies in
fashioning remedies. 30
Accordingly, SJF focuses on historical context, structural inequities,
intersecting oppressions, and underserved populations. In so doing,
SJF methods reveal issues that liberal feminism might fail to
recognize as having significant gender implications. 3 1

needs of under-served women. Social justice feminism is what the attendees
determined was their calling, with one participant remarking, "I don't want to do
feminism any more unless it's social justice feminism." Id. at 132.
26. Id. at 157.
27. Id. at 158.
28. Martha Chamallas, Social Justice Feminism: A New Take on
Intersectionality, 2014 FREEDOM CENTER J. 13 (2014); see also CHAMALLAS, supra
note 18, at 107-11 (identifying social justice feminism as a "promising variation" on
intersectional feminism).
29. Kalsem & Williams, supra note 25, at 175 (quoting Bartlett, supra note 20,
at 836).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 139. For example, we applied SJF to the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision in Long Island Care at Home v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007), which
upheld Department of Labor regulations exempting home health care workers from
overtime or minimum wage requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
SJF methods revealed that this apparently straightforward administrative law case
"raised powerful issues of race, gender, and class hierarchies." In drafting the FLSA,

....
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SJF's historical method emphasizes examining the past in order
to "understand subordinating structures" to identify the roots of
structural inequalities in order to dismantle them. 32 In this regard,
SJF follows in the footsteps of feminist and critical race theory in
seeking to "uncoverO lost histor[y] . . . [and] re-examin[e] how
history has been told and understood."33 Recognizing that history is
constructed, typically by those in power, SJF seeks to elevate the
experiences of those left on the margins to uncover how traditional
historical narratives mask and perpetuate subordination.34 Such a
perspective is especially necessary in this context given the highly
contested nature of the historical accounts articulated in Heller and
McDonald,35 upon which the Court heavily relied. Accordingly, the

Congress purposefully excluded domestic and agricultural workers from protection
because doing so would benefit African Americans and therefore erode support from
Southern lawmakers for the Act. Id. at 187. This history had major implications for
the present day because, in practice, the FLSA reinforced interlocking oppressions.
Specifically, women of color are overrepresented in the field of home health care,
physically and emotionally strenuous work that pays poorly. Thus, while the Court's
reading of the FLSA implementing regulations may have been consistent with
administrative law precedent, it unwittingly fortified Congress's discriminatory
intent by sanctioning "a pay structure that assure[d]that this job category [would]
remain the preserve of poor women of color, and thus, be perpetually underpaid." Id.
at 190. Finally, in seeking solutions informed by a "bottom-up" approach, we argued
that feminist legal advocates should add the Coke case to their agendas and organize
home health care workers to identify goals and strategies to correct the Court's
ruling. Id. at 191-92.
32. Id. at 175.
33. Id. at 175-76. We further explain that SJF "continues the work of
uncovering stories and experiences that have not been told or included in accounts of
history and examining how they alter ways of seeing." Id. at 177.
34. Id.
35. In McDonald, Justice Stevens disputed the history upon which the majority
relied, as well as the conclusions to which the Justices came based on it. McDonald,
561 U.S. at 899 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that the historic and plentiful
instances of violence against African Americans in the past "do not suggest that
every American must be allowed to own whatever type of firearm he or she desires
just that no group of American should be systematically and discriminatorily
disarmed and left to the mercy of racial terrorists."). Justice Breyer noted that, since
the Court decided Heller, "historians, scholars, and judges have continued to express
the view that the Court's historical account was flawed." Id. at 914. Justice Alito
responded that while "there is certainly room for disagreement about Heller's
analysis of the history of the right to keep and bear arms, nothing written since
Heller persuades us to reopen the question." Id. at 788. Historian Saul Cornell
derided Heller, calling it "little more than a lawyer's version of a magician's parlor
trick-admittedly clever, but without any intellectual heft." Saul Cornell,
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parts that follow examine the Second Amendment's history with an
eye toward exposing the context within which it emerged, a setting
that established the foundation for a race- and gender-based social
hierarchy.

II. THE RATIFICATION PERIOD: DEFINING "NATION"
In Heller, the Court dissected the text of the Second Amendment,
examining portions of what it called the "prefatory" and "operative"
clauses to determine how the framers understood the terms therein
at that time.36 Justice Scalia turned to pre- and post-ratification era
sources to conclude that the operative clause was meant to
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons for self
defense purposes.37 The Court next determined that the prefatory
clause, which references militias, was consistent with the operative
clause because ''history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated
a militia . . . was not by banning the militia but simply by taking
away the people's arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to
suppress political opponents."38 When viewed through an SJF lens,
the Court's examination of history is incomplete.
SJF reveals that the ratification history of the Second
Amendment included a debate about the structure of the new nation.
As the next sections will demonstrate, the framers intended the
Second Amendment to amplify checks and balances on governmental
overreach and to establish the metes and bounds of "nation" and
"citizenship," terms limited to white men.39 In this way, SJF reveals
that the Second Amendment defended white patriarchy, helping
establish a system that would subordinate those who fell outside the
privileged category of citizen.

Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller,
690 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626 (2008).
36. &e Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
37. Id. at 592.
38. Id. at 598.
39. &e, e.g., IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE 27-34 (2006) (discussing racialized and gendered aspects of citizenship under
the Bill of Rights); Gretchen Ritter, Womens Civic Inclusion and the Bill of Rights,
in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 60-82 (Linda C.
McClain & Joanna L. Grossman, eds. 2009) (arguing that the Bill of Rights
preserved a gender social order).
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A. ''.A Well-Regulated Militia':· Structural Protection against

Tyranny
Our Constitution arose from the ashes of the Articles of
Confederation. The Articles established a loose alliance of sovereign
states that essentially acted in their own interests: failing to pay
into a common treasury, disregarding treaties, and erecting
discriminatory and retaliatory trade barriers toward each other, to
name a few transgressions. 40 These difficulties, in addition to the
absence of a legislative body empowered to raise revenue and the
difficulty of making changes when needed because of the text's
unanimity requirement, propelled colonists to amend the document.
However, when the delegates assembled for that task, they
immediately set about creating a new charter that divided power
between the state and federal governments and among three
branches of centralized government.
Provisions addressing military power and militias, including the
Second Amendment, reflect the framers' concerns regarding tyranny
and power sharing. For example, Article I authorizes Congress to
"raise and support Armies,"41 but limits its ability to appropriate
funds for such purposes to two years, 42 a period that coincides with
the terms of the House of Representatives. 43 In addition, as legal
scholars Richard Uviller and William Merkel observed, "since all
funding measures were to originate in the lower House, the question
of the army's longevity was never far removed from popular
control,"44 further confining the growth of the military.
The Second Amendment, part of the Bill of Rights agreed to in
exchange for unanimous ratification by the states, addressed what
long had been a key concern: colonists' distaste for a standing army.
Uviller and Merkel have explained that Americans shared their
English forbearers anxieties over a professional military:

40. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the
Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 891 (1990); AKIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 28 (2005) (observing that "[b]y 1787, the Confederation
was in shambles").
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also, H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G.
MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMs, OR How THE SECOND AMENDMENT
FELL SILENT 77 (2002).
44. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 43, at 77.
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[that] public virtue was both the source and goal of any
legitimate exercise of public authority. Public virtue implied
a common purpose, a dedication that transcended individual
interest. Its antithesis was corruption, both individual and
constitutional. . . . The vilest engine of constitutional
corruption was the standing army .... Military power in the
hands of a professional band of soldiers-whose loyalty to the
government was unleavened by personal commitment to the
community, the people, or the concerns of local security-was
anathema to the ideals of civic virtue.45
Colonists thus feared that a standing army would consist of men
sullied either by self-interest or dedication to a distant and detached
sovereign. They preferred a militia populated by citizen-soldiers,
men connected to their communities upon whom they could depend
to be loyal.
In a similar vein, the framers believed that a standing army
threatened state sovereignty. During ratification debates, Virginia's
George Mason46 argued that "Congress may neglect to provide for
arming and disciplining the militia; and the state governments
cannot do it, for Congress has an exclusive right to arm them."47
Delegates to that state's ratifying convention therefore proposed the
following:
That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a
well regulated Militia composed of the body of the people
trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a
free State. That standing armies in time of peace are
dangerous to liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as
far as the circumstances and protection of the Community
will admit; and that in all cases the military should be under
strict subordination to and governed by the Civil power.48

45. Id. at 42.
46. Saul Cornell explains that Mason's reasoning is especially salient because
he "was a leading patriot and took a major role in the creation of [Virginia's]
militia . . . . Mason's emphasis on the need for the militia composed of property
holders reflected a view common among members of Virginia's gentry elite that it
was dangerous to arm the 'rabble."' Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1700 (2012).
47. UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 43, at 85.
48. Id. at 86.
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As a result, in language very similar to that ultimately adopted by
the framers, Virginia linked the right to bear arms to militias in
order to preempt overreaching by the central government. While the
wording of the ratified Amendment departed somewhat from this
draft, it nonetheless indicates a purpose on the part of the framers
that the Second Amendment would be among the panoply of
Constitutional provisions designed to maintain a balance of powers
among the three federal branches of government and between the
state and national sovereigns. As a structural matter, the
Amendment shores up the "two-tiered division of military control
between the executive and legislative federal branches, and between
the national and state authorities." 49 In addition to performing as a
bulwark against federal overreaching, the Amendment's history
sheds light on how the Framers contemplated "the people" whose
rights it protects, which the next section considers.

B. "The Right of the People':· Constructing Nation and Citizen
The historical context leading up to and including ratification
indicates that the phrase "the people" also served structural ends
namely, identifying those who were part of the new nation's
citizenry. Building on pre-existing regulation of firearms and
consistent with other parts of the Constitution,50 the Second
Amendment contemplated "people" who were white and male.5 1
Regulation of guns long served the function of reinforcing social
and economic status. Alexander DeConde has explained that early
colonists transported the English tradition of limiting firearms to
men from the upper class, noting, for example, that "[i]n the first
company of 105 English settlers who established Jamestown,

49. Id. at 76. Richard Epstein also has argued that the Amendment, when read
in concert with other constitutional provisions regarding militias, reflects federalism
concerns and reinforces checks and balances on the centralized government, as well
as among the branches of government. Richard Epstein, A Structural Interpretation
of the Second Amendment: Why Heller is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds,
59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 175-76 (2008) (comparing the Second Amendment to
provisions in Articles I and II).
50. &e, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting en8laved persons as three
fifths of a person and excluding Native peoples for purposes of apportioning
Representatives and direct taxes); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (requiring the return
of runaway slaves).
51. See Becker, supra note 9, at 494. But see Epstein, supra note 49, at 178
(stating without support that the Second Amendment "extends to everyone,
including women, whether or not they are or ever will be members of the militia").
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Virginia, in 1607, only the gentlemen among them had the privilege
of carrying firearms."52 As the colonists dispersed across the
continent, so, too, did the understanding that only the "right" people
should have guns.
However, in the New World, race became the most salient
characteristic. Kathleen Brown has argued that state regulations
helped construct racial and gender norms, particularly establishing
patriarchy as the sole province of white men.53 Such rules
contributed to establishing the social meaning of race and gender in
this country. For example, in seventeenth century Virginia, selling
or trading firearms to Indians could result in forfeiting one's
estate.54 In some places, the penalty for doing so could be death,55
demonstrating how great a threat to communities the early settlers
considered Native people. Other communities required white men to
arm themselves in church ''because of the establishment's anxiety
that slaves would rebel during the gathering for prayer."56 Brown
further observed that although ''legislators had been reluctant to
include African laborers among those required to carry arms at
church, [they] stopped short of prohibiting slaves from owning
weapons,"57 in part because of concerns about rebellions or attacks
by Native Americans.58 However, Brown noted that colonial
Virginia's race and gender lines became more pronounced as time
progressed; by 1723, the legislature passed laws explicitly
prohibiting Black and Native men from being armed. 59 One such

52. ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL 17 (2001).
53. KATHLEEN M. BROWN, Goon WIVES, NASTY WENCHES, AND ANxious
PATRIARCHS 181 (1996). Brown defines patriarchy as "the historically specific
authority of the father over his household, rooted in his control over labor and
property, his sexual access to his wife and dependent female laborers, his control
over other men's sexual access to the women of his household, and his right to punish
family members and laborers." Id. at 4.
54. "[W]hat person or persons soever [sic] shall barter or sell with any Indian or
Indians for peice [sic], powder, or shott [sic], and being thereof lawfully convicted,
shall forfeite [sic] his whole estate." WILLIAM WALLER HENNING, THE STATUTES AT
LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, VOL. I 441 (1823).
55. DECONDE, supra note 52, at 18. However, despite the overt bans, colonists
would provide arms to tribes with whom they had joined forces against other Native
peoples or encroaching settlers. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 21.
57. BROWN, supra note 53, at 182.
58. DECONDE, supra note 52, at 19.
59. BROWN, supra note 53, at 182.
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measure, "An Act for the settling and better regulation of the
Militia," provided that
free Negros, Mulattos, or Indians . . . may be listed and
emploied [sic] as drummers or trumpeters: And that upon
any invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, all free Negros,
Mulattos, or Indians, shall be obliged to attend and march
with the militia, and to do the duty of pioneers, or such other
servile labour as they shall be directed to perform. 60
The same year, lawmakers passed "[a]n Act . . . for the better
government of Negros, Mulattos, and Indians, bond or free."61 This
law prohibited Blacks and Native people from ''keep[ing], or
carry[ing] any gun, powder, or any club, or other weapon
whatsoever, offensive or defensive,"62 unless they were free and "a
house-keeper,"63 which, according to a dictionary of that time period
meant ''householder; master of a family."64
Through such measures, lawmakers constructed a social
hierarchy in which enslaved people, as well as Native Americans,
occupied the lower rungs.6 5 These statutes did not contemplate
slaves and Indians as being suitable men for defending the state.
Unlike white men, they needed an additional marker of
masculinity-owning property and heading a household-in order to
own a weapon.66 The regulations surrounding militia service thus
mirrored the social strata, as Brown observes:

60. WILLIAM WALLER HENNING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, VOL. IV 119 (1820). In addition, Blacks
or Native men who sought to appear in a muster could be fined 100 pounds of
tobacco; failure to pay meant such men would be "tied neck and heels [to] remain for
any time not exceeding twenty minutes." Id. at 120.
61. Id. at 126.
62. Id. at 134.
63. Id.
64. SAMUEL L. JOHNSON, ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(6th ed. 1785).
65. The "Act ... for the better government of Negros, Mulattos, and Indians"
included many provisions that both indicated the low status of this group and
guaranteed they would remain subordinate. Among them, measures that: prohibited
slaves from meeting without their masters' consent; authorized slaveowners to
dismember "incorrigible runaways and other slaves" without facing prosecution or
punishment if such treatment resulted in slaves dying; and forbade Blacks and
Native men from voting in any election. HENNING, supra note 60, at 129, 132-34.
66. Even then, the law limited such men to owning one firearm; any surplus
weapon would have to be sold. Id. at 131. However, there was an exception for Blacks
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A wealthy planter ... would normally serve as commander
in chief over the militia of the county. At the governor's
order, the commander would muster the militia in a field for
parades or in response to an alarm. Men of substance
received commissions as officers; other propertied planters
would form a troop of horses. Less well-to-do men would
comprise a 'company of foot.' Finally, black men would
appear unarmed and be required to play the bugle or
drums.67
By prohibiting Black and Native men from owning weapons and
serving in the militia (unless they were servants or musicians), such
laws participated in an overarching racial and gendered project that
cast these men as "other."68 Such laws distinguished Black and
Native men from white men, even those lacking property and other
markers of status, and placed them in another category devoid of
masculinity and its attendant privileges. As Brown notes, this legal
regime "relegated [such men] to a status equivalent to that of other
dependents:" namely, women and children.69 Indeed, a Norfolk,
Virginia, court relieved a slave from having to pay a penalty for
having shot a white man's horse because he was "under couvert," a
term ordinarily applied to married women, 10 meaning "under the
wing" of a head of household. This regime ensured that the proper
realm for African American men in particular was the private
sphere, where they lacked autonomy because they answered to the
patriarch of the estate, a white man.
As Virginia's example suggests,71 colonial lawmakers established
a legal regime that excluded Black and Indian men from accessing

and Native Americans living on "frontier plantations," provided they secured a
license." Id. Thus, weapons were permissible for the purpose of fighting off Indians.
67. BROWN, supra note 53, at 279.
68. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 125 (3d ed. 2015) (defining racial projects as "attempts both to shape the
ways in which social structures are racially signified and the ways that racial
meanings are embedded in social structures"); see also HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 39,
at 116 (observing that racial categories are "relational and hierarchical." Thus, white
identity depends upon the law's construction of non-whites to exist).
69. BROWN, supra note 53, at 183.
70. Id. at 183.
71. It should be noted that Virginia was among the most powerful of the
colonies; proponents of the Constitution saw its approval as essential to ensuring
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the privileges flowing from masculinity, such as owning arms and
serving in the militia.In so doing, the law contructed these men as
dangerous and, by removing the perceived threat they posed,
rendered them dependent at law and in society. Accordingly,
regulation of firearms and militias helped establish and reinforce an
alternative and inferior formulation of manhood---one that did not
participate in public life and by definition was not a citizen.72
Sixty-five years later, the Supreme Court proclaimed that the
framers had such a purpose in Dred Scott v. Sandford.73 At issue in
that case was whether traveling to the Missouri Territory rendered
Mr. Scott a free man. The Court framed the question before it as
follows:
"Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this
country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the political
community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution . . . and as such become entitled to all the
rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied [sic] by
that instrument to the citizen?"74
Relying upon the text of the Constitution and statutes of the various
states at the time of the founding, the Court found that Mr. Scott, as
a Black man, was not so entitled. According to the Court, the
framers never
intended to secure to [Blacks] rights, and privileges, and
rank, in tho new political body throughout the Union ....
More especially, it cannot be believed that the large
slaveholding States regarded them as included in the word
citizens, or would have consented to a Constitution which

that the document ultimately would be ratified. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 1787-88, 27 4 (2010).
72. DeConde also explains that similar exclusions also applied to new
immigrants, observing that "as [the] population grew and became more diverse, old
line white Protestants came to dislike the idea of arming strange, immigrant males,
such as Irish Catholic youths, in draft militias and training them to shoot."
DECONDE, supra note 52, at 48. As a result, they collaborated with advocates for
defunding militias, thus "disuguis[ing] their desire for selective gun regulation." Id.
73. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
74. Id. at 403. It should be noted that, with respect to Native Americans, the
Court observed that they had "always been treated as foreigners not living under our
Government;" however, they could become citizens of the States, as well as the
nation, by being naturalized by Congress. Id. at 404.
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might compel them to receive them in that character from
another State. For if they were so received, and entitled to
the privileges and immunities of citizens .... It would give
to persons of the negro race . . . . the right to . . . keep and
carry arms wherever they went .... and inevitably produc[e]
discontent and insubordination among them, and
endangering the peace and safety of the State.75
According to the Court, Black citizenship was not just contrary to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, it was antithetical to peace
and national security.
As the foregoing suggests, when examined from the vantage
point of SJF, the historical context which produced the Second
Amendment was one that never contemplated Blacks as part of the
nation's citizenry. Indeed, firearm regulation helped establish racial
and gender categories that justified oppressions such as slavery,
dispossessing Native people, and relegating women to the domestic
arena. In this connection, key parts of the Amendment's text-"the
people" and "militia"-carried gendered and racialized meanings of
which the framers doubtless were aware, as these word choices were
consistent with their notions of who best would move the fledgling
democratic republic forward. This vision of the Constitution would
remain unchallenged until after the Civil War.
Ill. RECONSTRUCTION ERA: THE STRUGGLE FOR REDEFINITION

Just as in Heller, the Court turned to history in McDonald to
conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Second
Amendment to the states.76 Revisiting Heller's historical narrative,
the McDonald Court reiterated that the framers considered the right
to keep and bear arms to be a fundamental one.77 The Court then
examined the right in the context of the Civil War and
Reconstruction eras. Justice Alito noted that abolitionists of those
times supported the right and that newly freed slaves combated
systemic attempts by former Confederate soldiers to disarm them. 78
Justice Alito also found that the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866
mentioned the right to bear arms.79 Therefore, according to the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.at416-17.
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 770-71.
Id. at 773.
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Court, arming the formerly enslaved was essential for their self
defense against the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups, a reading of
history that supported the individual right first found in Heller.
However, viewing this history through the prism of SJF
demonstrates that the Court's narrative was superficial and
incomplete.
The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments sought to
expand the antebellum notion of "citizen,'' in part by granting
freedmen rights long denied to them as outliers and perceived
threats to the social order. In this regard, the Reconstruction
narrative revolves around much more than an individual right to
self-defense. Rather, in the postbellum years, the framers recognized
the right to bear arms as essential to integrating Black men into the
nation as citizens, voters, and soldiers to whom communities could
turn for protection.
Reconstruction and the legislative provisions born during this
period upended the antebellum social order, enraging Southern
whites who vehemently opposed these changes and resolved to strip
Black men of any rights connected to citizenship. SJF's emphasis on
identifying the historical roots of subordinating structures therefore
reveals that during the Reconstruction era, the right to keep and
bear arms could have been a tool for Black liberation and entwining
with the national fabric; instead, whites resisted the threat posed by
Blacks assuming the mantles of citizenship and manhood through
the right to bear arms and the interrelated right to vote. These
changes fueled violent opposition that ultimately thwarted
Reconstruction's
transformative
potential
and
cemented
intransigent white patriarchal norms.
As discussed below, losing the Civil War sparked much of this
hostility. For many southern white men, defeat signaled a
diminution of their masculinity and a racial abomination in part,
because any advance by Blacks-men in particular-represented a
concomitant setback for whites-again, specifically men.so Put
differently, the societal transformation Reconstruction portended
signified an end to white men's "natural" place at the top of the
racial and gender social order. As a result, former Confederate
legislatures enacted laws that sought to return African Americans to
slavery in all but name. When Congress overrode such measures
with federal legislation, white men's sense of worth further

80.

Cf. Anne Sarah Rubin, A SHA'ITERED NATION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE

CONFEDERACY, 1861-1868 103 (2005) ("From the Confederate perspective, any
attempt to grant manhood to blacks was a threat to the Confederacy.").
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plummeted as emancipated slaves gained rights their masters
formerly monopolized. Without the framework and approbation
slavery provided to assert their masculinity, these men violently
sought to repudiate Reconstruction and reinforce the message that
manhood belonged to whites alone, in the process targeting markers
of Black masculinity: the rights to vote and to keep and bear arms,
which frequently were considered in tandem.si In order to stem the
rise of "negro supremacy" under the amended Constitution, protect
white womanhood, and in so doing, reestablish white patriarchy,
emergent hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klans2 embarked on a
racialized and
gendered terror campaign to dismantle
Reconstruction and restore white men to the top of the social
hierarchy. It is in this context that the antebellum right to bear and
keep arms was simultaneously rejected and defended, along with its
attendant construct of "citizen."

A. Post-Civil War: Seismic Change to the Social Order
The Civil War brought the end of slavery and promised a
reordering of society that repelled southern whites. With freedom,
Blacks could be paid employees and regulate their own families.
Black men could engage in civic life by voting or holding public
office. By affording the formerly enslaved agency over their lives,
emancipation disrupted a regime that constructed African
Americans as perpetually dependent. Moreover, by making the
public sphere accessible to Black men through the franchise and the

81. Cf. Becker, supra note 9, at 500 (observing that "ultimate political power
lies with those who control the means of force") (quotation omitted).
82. The Ku Klux Klan was the "first and most notorious of the Reconstruction
era" hate groups; but by no means the only such group. According to Lisa Cardyn,
the Reconstruction era saw the burgeoning of "white supremacist groups-notably
the Pale Faces, the '76 Association, the White Brotherhood, and the Knights of the
White Camelia," which shared the Klan's objectives and methods, such that they
were "substantially indistinguishable from the real KKK" In this regard, the Klan
should be "understood as a kind of umbrella organization embodying the array of
white supremacist groups that grew up in the postwar years." Lisa Cardyn,
Sexualized Racism/Gendered Violence: Outraging the Body Politic in the
Reconstruction South, 100 MICH. L. REV. 675, 680-89 (2002) (citations omitted).
W.E.B. DuBois was among the first scholars to document the history of such
organizations, noting that, generally speaking, they were "determined to drive out
the new Northern capitalist, and reduce the Negroes to slavery." W.E.B. DUBOIS,
BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA: 1860-1880 679 (The Free Press 1998) (1935).
For purposes of this article, I will refer generally to the Klan because it exemplifies
organized terroristic opposition to Reconstruction.
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workplace, former enslaved men could stake a claim to hegemonic
masculinity that had been denied them. The postbellum years and
Reconstruction presaged a new nation that would require whites to
share citizenship status with former slaves, an opprobrious notion
for many.
Before the war, white southern men-wealthy planters and
working class whites alike-relied on race and slavery to reinforce
their positions in society. Slave status for African Americans meant
perpetual subservience to a master and consignment to the private
realm, where they were regulated by others and lacked ownership
over their work or any products resulting from it.83 In this regard,
the institution of slavery---de jure or de facto-necessarily imposed
upon Black men and women norms that, in white society, applied
only to women and children. Those norms formed the basis of race
and gender-based classifications that elevated whiteness and
masculinity. Under this paradigm, African American males were not
considered to be "true" men, not even when compared to white
laboring men who lacked property or means.84 Similarly, Black
women would not be considered ''ladies."85
After the Civil War, white southerners sought to preserve to this
state of affairs. To whites in the defeated Confederacy, the changes
imposed by and resulting from Reconstruction were antithetical to
their vision of the United States. Reconstruction removed white men
from their rightful place atop the social hierarchy. Making Black
men citizens amounted to a seismic shift for southern whites who
"jealously guarded the traditional emblems of citizenship .... They
evidenced a corresponding defensiveness with respect to the less
formal signifiers of the masculine citizenO, most notably the ability
to order one's familial life from the position of household head."86
Lisa Cardyn observed that

83. See generally LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND CONFUSION: THE
POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION 68-80 (1997) (explaining that as the
concept of free labor emerged, race was a factor in understanding the degree of
independence workers had, with Blacks being completely dependent and at the
lowest rung of that hierarchy).
84. Id. at 72 (noting that "white working men used feminine dependence to
naturalize masculine independence").
85. &e Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Singk-&x Education and
the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 15, 45-47 (discussing how
slave status meant that Black women could not become "true" women).
86. Cardyn, supra note 82, at 816.
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Southern men in general and klansmen in particular were
inclined to apprehend their struggle with the former slaves
as a zero sum game: whatever was granted to freedmen was
necessarily relinquished by whites. Indeed, one commentator
hyperbolized that the rise of the freedmen from a position of
abject slavery had reduced southern whites to a "naked and
defenceless condition."87
Maryland Governor Thomas Swann voiced a similar concern m
objecting to granting the franchise to Black men:
The white man can never be educated to believe that the
negro is his equal, nor can he be persuaded, unless warped in
his heretofore fixed impressions, that the two races can be
brought together in political or social fraternization upon
terms of equality without degradation to his own. . . . This
Government was never intended by its founders to be shared
by the African race .... It was a white man's Government
exclusively.ss

Such sentiments undergird opposition to federal policies to facilitate
freed slaves' entry into the polity. For example, the Democratic
Party, in setting forth its platform for the 1868 elections, decried
federal occupation of the South and the Freedmen's Bureau as
"political instrumentalities designed to secure negro supremacy."89
This sentiment reflected the South's legislative strategy to
resuscitate slavery by enacting black codes. Such laws had the overt
purpose of ensuring that African Americans would be productive
members of society, but their true design was maintaining white
supremacy. For example, Mississippi Governor Benjamin
Humphreys claimed that "sudden emancipation" had resulted in the
"the evils . . . [of] vagrancy and pauperism, and their inevitable
concomitant crime and misery, [which hung] like a dark pall over a
once prosperous and happy, but now desolated land."9o To counter

87. Id. at 818-19.
88. Maryland: Message of Gov. Swann-The State Militia-Negro Suffrage and
Negro Equality, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1868, at 2.
89. The Democratic Convention: A New Platform Ileported and Adopted, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 1868, at 1 (hereinafter Convention).
90. Mississippi: Message of Gov. Humphreys to the Legislature on Negro Troops,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1865, at 3 (hereinafter Humphreys' Message).
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these purported deficiencies of the formerly enslaved, the Texas
legislature, for example, enacted a measure imposing a one dollar
fine upon Blacks for "failing to obey reasonable orders, neglect of
duty, leaving home without permission, impudence, [and] swearing
[at] or [using] indecent language to an employer."91
In addition, consistent with their rejection of Black citizenship
per se, 92 legislators also passed laws proscribing African Americans
from purchasing, owning, or using firearms, and prohibiting whites
from selling guns to Blacks.93 For instance, Mississippi state law did
"not recognize the Negro as having any right to carry arms."94 States
broadly prohibited Black men from serving in state militias.95
Regulating the keeping and bearing of arms was about more
than limiting Black efforts at self-defense: it was part of a larger
legislative scheme to distinguish and disadvantage African
American men, keeping citizenship beyond their reach.96 Cognizant
of such attempts to re-enslave African Americans, Congress enacted
measures to realize the Thirteenth Amendment's promise of liberty,
which, while essential to integrating Blacks into society, further
inflamed white hostility to the new nation it heralded.

B. Reconstruction and its Discontents: Guns, Militias, and a
Reordered Society
In the face of Southern intransigence to emancipation, Congress
enacted the Reconstruction Amendments and implementing
legislation to vitiate the black codes, including statutes targeting
state militias.97 Taking the latter step was necessary because
citizen-soldiers in the former Confederate states violently opposed
the grant of freedom to Blacks. Historian Otis Singletary observed
that militia:

91. DOUGIAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF,
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 178 (2014) (quoting Barry
Crouch, "'All the Vile Passions'.· The Texas Back Code of 1866," 97 S.W. HIST. Q. 21,
24 (1993)).
92. Convention, supra note 89, at 1 (noting that the "negro is free, whether we
like it or not.... To be free, however, does not make him a citizen, or entitle him to
political or social equality with the white man").
93. SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND
THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 168-69 (2006).
94. OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION 5 (1957).
95. CORNELL, supra note 93, at 169.
96. Cf. Humphreys' Message, supra note 90.
97. CORNELL, supra note 93. at 175-76; SINGLETARY, supra note 94, at 6.
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[m]embership was restricted exclusively to whites and was
composed primarily of former rebel soldiers, who persisted in
wearing their Confederate gray. Their activities were frankly
terroristic and aimed directly at Negroes who displayed a
tendency to assert their newly granted independence.
Disarming the freedmen was apparently considered a
primary duty and one that was fulfilled with relish. 98
Union leaders of the Freedmen's Bureau in various Southern states
informed Congress about militia violence targeting the former
enslaved in hearings. For example, General Thomas testified that in
Mississippi, the militia was "abusive" and that it:
assisted to paralyze labor, and add to the combination of
difficulties under which the State has labored. . . . [T]wo
companies of the militia had sworn that in their counties no
negro who did not work for his old master, and no Yankee
could live; that they would "drive out the thieving Yankees
and shoot the niggers."99
In Georgia, the militia was "engaged in disarming the negroes," as
well as burning schools and issuing death threats to teachers.100 In
Louisiana, an Army officer reported that "[n]ot a day or night passes
but what many victims are murdered by the white confederate·
citizens.... All around in the country is one tale of abuse, woe, and
misery, the master taking vengeance because his slaves are free."101
Another general suggested that such harms were compounded by the
fact that these militia organizations "give the color of law to their
violent, unjust, and sometimes inhuman proceedings."102 Based on
such reports, Senator Henry Wilson concluded that the "rebel militia
has been disastrous to peace and security of loyal men and
freedmen. I trust Congress will see to it that armed rebels are not
permitted to outrage the rights and endanger the lives of the
people."103

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

SINGLETARY, supra note 94, at 5.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 914 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Over constitutional objections, Congress passed a joint resolution
temporarily disbanding the militias in former Confederate states in
1867.104 Some members argued that this provision exceeded
Congressional authority and violated the Second Amendment.105
Like other supporters of the measure, Senator Wilson charged that
the law was necessary to counteract what amounted to a
continuation of the rebellion:
[T]hese men were once disarmed when General Lee and
General Johnston and the other rebel generals surrendered.
They are the same men. . . . There is one unbroken chain of
testimony from all people that are loyal to this country, that
the greatest outrages are perpetrated by armed men who go
up and down the country ... disarming people... I believe
this Congress has [the] power to disarm ruffians or traitors,
or men who are committing outrages against law or the
rights of men on our common humanity. I have no doubt of
our right to prevent the organization in the rebel States of
any militia force .... 100
This law thus took its place alongside other statutes designed to
"reconstruct" the states formerly in rebellion-such as requiring
them to ratify new constitutions eliminating discrimination as a
condition for re-admittance to the union.107 President Andrew
Johnson decried both as running afoul of the Constitution and

104.

The legislation provided as follows:

[A]ll militia forces now organ.ired or in service in either of the States of
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, be forthwith disarmed and disbanded,
and that the further organization, arming, or calling into service of the said
militia forces, or any party thereof, is hereby prohibited under any
circumstances whatever until the same shall be authorized by Congress.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1848 (1867). It was amended to delete
"disarmed," to address the concern that the law "relate[d] to people" and not just to
the States. Id. at 1849. During the debate, members reiterated the temporary nature
of the measure, noting that "it prevents armed rebel organizations in any of these
States until matters are settled." Id.
105. Id. West Virginia Senator Waitman Willey objected on those grounds, but
ultimately supported the measure when its sponsor struck "disarmed" from it. Id.
106. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 915 (1867).
107. CORNELL, supra note 93, at 176.
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deserving of being "annulled."108 These provisions departed sharply
from antebellum understandings of the balance of power between
the federal and state governments under the Constitution; however,
lawmakers and other public figures justified federal intervention in
this context as a proper exercise of Congress's War Powers. For
example, Richard H. Dana, Jr., U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts at
the time, noted that. cessation of armed conflict did not guarantee
that the South would uphold "public safety and public faith" for
blacks and whites alike. 109 As a result, the federal government had
to impose measures to ensure that the formerly enslaved were truly
free: "[T]he public faith is pledged that every man, woman and child
of them, and their posterity forever, shall have a complete and
perfect freedom." 11 0 Dana also averred that, in addition to being
constitutional, such actions were radical and necessary for the public
good: ''To introduce the free negroes to the voting franchise is a
revolution."111
Indeed, congressional debate concerning the Reconstruction
Amendments and legislation intended to realize their goals, reveals
that others shared Dana's assessment. For example, when the
Senate considered the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1870, Republicans
addressed charges that they sought to "subvert the whole system of
self-government and all the political institutions to which this
country owes so many of its blessings." 112 Missouri Senator Carl
Schurz responded as follows:
Yes, sir, this Republic has passed through a revolutionary
process of tremendous significance. Yes, the Constitution of
the United States has been changed in some most essential
points; that change does amount to a great revolution, and
this bill is one of its legitimate children.... We all remember
that the most powerful political interest in this country for a
long period previous to the war was that of slavery. We
remember also that the slave power, finding itself at war

108. Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley, Andrew Johnson, Fourth Annual
Message, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=29509.
109. Reconstruction: Speech of Hon. Richard H. Dana at the Meeting in Faneuil
Hall, Boston, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1865 at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3. He continued to note that "the poor, oppressed degraded black
man, bearing patiently his oppression until he can endure it no longer, rising with
arms for his rights-do you want to see that?'' Again, the crowd responded ''No." Id.
112. CONG. GLOBE, 4lst Cong., 2d Sess. 3607 (1870) (statement of Sen. Schurz).
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with the conscience of mankind ... sought safety behind the
bulwark of what they euphoniously called local self
government, and intrenched [sic] itself in the doctrine of
State sovereignty. To be sure, it made, from that defensive
position, offensive sallies, encroaching on the rights of the
non-slaveholding States, as for instance in the case of the
notorious fugitive slave law . . . . And what did that
revolution put in its place? It gave us three great
amendments to the national Constitution. . . . It made the
liberty and rights of every citizen in every State a matter of
national concern. Out of a republic of arbitrary local
organizations it made a republic of equal citizens .... 11 3
Reconstruction proponents accepted and celebrated the fact
that the new Amendments eradicated the status quo by erasing, to
some extent, the line separating federal matters from state concerns.
As Representative Schurz's speech suggests, state sovereignty had
been a convenient artifice, wielded to facilitate oppression that was
at odds with the nation's creed. According to Schurz, the
"revolutionary" Reconstruction amendments rebuilt the nation in a
manner that was true to its founding principles of liberty and
equality.11 4
As a practical matter, however, this revolutionary phase placed
the new Republican governments in a precarious situation, as hostile
Democrats sought to unseat them by ballot, bullet, or both. For
example, in South Carolina, the Klan embarked on an effort
intended to "put an end to a situation that threatened to leave no
part of South Carolina secure for white supremacy."115 Arkansas
Senator Benjamin Rice described the carnage leading up to the 1868
election:
[T]here was a systematic course of assassination that
resulted in the destruction of over two hundred Union men
in that State. A member of Congress was killed, State
senators were assassinated, members of the House of
Representatives, registers, and leading Union men in various

113. Id. at 3607-08.
114. Id. at 3607.
115. Herbert Shapiro, The Ku Klux Klan During Reconstruction: The South
Carolina Episode, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 34, 40 (1964).
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counties of the State were assassinated without any . . .
opportunity of defense.ll6
In the face of such violence, and at the urging of state lawmakers,
Congress repealed the militia ban to protect the new governments
from resentful and dangerous members of the electorate.ll7
State governors then established new military units, which
included African Americans. The "Negro militias," were a "political
and military institution, providing a means of protecting and
organizing freedmen,"ns necessary to combat the Klan's avowed
purpose of "'killing all these damned niggers that vote the radical
ticket."'ll9 President Grant recognized that Klan violence was
intended to strip African Americans of every vestige of their new
status. In a message to the House of Representatives, he observed
that the Klan's goals:

were by force and terror to prevent all political action not in
accord with the views of the members; to deprive colored
citizens of the right to bear arms and of the right to a free
ballot; to suppress schools in which colored children were
taught, and to reduce the colored people to a condition closely
akin to that of slavery.120
Grant's message suggested that he viewed armed militia service as
tantamount to exercising the franchise: a right and responsibility
related to to citizenship. It was this understanding of the right to
bear arms during Reconstruction that particularly infuriated the
Klan, which claimed to respect the Constitution, ''but only ... that
version in effect before 1865.The Klan sought to nullify any concept
of constitutional liberty that included the extension [of the vote] to
Negroes . . . . [It] was particularly concerned with disarming the
Negroes."121 Disarmament in this context implicated more than self
defense. As mentioned above, former Confederates had turned to

116. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 83 (1868).
117. Id. at 86.
118. CORNELL, supra nore 93, at 176.
119. 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Report of the Joint Select Commitree to
Inquire into the Condition of Affairs in the Lare Insurrectionary Stares, Vol. V 1719
(Feb. 19. 1872) https://archive.org/details/reportofjointsel05unit.
120. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS: 1789-1897 164 (1898) https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.
39015068011728;view=lup;seq=ll (emphasis added).
121. Shapiro, supra nore 115, at 44.
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violence to reject Reconstruction in form and substance, particularly
the notion of Black men as fellow citizens. 122 Accordingly, the acts of
terror in which they engaged were directed at the franchise and its
armed protectors. The Black militia was a natural target.
Notwithstanding the name, some of these military forces were
integrated; but, according to Singletary, "[a]s in heredity, so in the
militia, a touch of Negro was sufficient to brand it as all Negro in the
eyes of most Southern whites."123 In this regard, many Southerners
were hostile to the Negro militia not only because of race, but also
because the federal government activated them to assist Republican
state governments. 124 For white southerners, the social meaning of
the militia had shifted from being a manifestation of nation and the
embodiment of white American masculinity, to being an enemy and
foreign force in the former Confederacy.
Reconstruction meant Black men no longer were dependent
charges relegated to the domestic sphere. Black men were free to
engage in the public affairs of their communities and the nation by
voting. 12 5 Militia service cemented that posture as African American
men took their place among the defenders of state security. 126 In
practice, the rights to vote and bear and keep arms were mutually
reinforcing, as the latter helped ensure the former. 127 Similarly,
voting for Republican candidates typically meant that Black rights
would remain protected, at least as a matter oflaw. 128 For example,
in South Carolina, Republican gubernatorial candidate Robert K.
Scott activated the Black militia to protect African American voters
in the 1870 election, after two years of systemic violence targeting
Black voters in county elections.129 This muster had been essential
two years earlier in countering Klan intimidation at the polls, and

122. See Williams, supra now 85 and accompanying wxt.
123. SINGLETARY, supra now 94, at 15-16.
124. Id. at 29-30.
125. See EDWARDS, supra now 83, at 196-97 (observing the ways in which
African American men demonstrawd their masculinity through political
engagement, among other things).
126. CORNELL, supra now 93, at 176. Cf. also Jane Dailey, Deference and
Violence in the Postbellum Urban South: Manners and Massacres in Danville,
Virginia, 63 J.S. HIST. 553, 569(1997) (discussing white "resent[ment] of African
American police officers).
127. Cf. DECONDE, supra note 52, at 75 (stating that "African Americans viewed
guns as symbols of freedom as well as instruments with which to defend it").
128. See EGERTON, supra note 91, at 241 (detailing Freedmen's Bureau's reports
of violence against Blacks who had voiced their inwntion to vow).
129. Shapiro, supra now 115, at 39.
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resulted in Republican victories in counties that previously had gone
Democratic due to Klan disturbances.130
As Black voters exercised these rights, white supremacists
redoubled their efforts to vindicate the notion that the United States
was "a white man's country."13 1 Race and gender combined not only
to reinforce the antebellum notion of citizenship, but also to justify
the existence of such groups. For example, Ku Klux Klan members
pledged that "females, friends, widows, and their households, shall
be the special object of [their] care and protection." 132 Against this
backdrop, the Klan embarked on a campaign of terror to counteract
the effects of Reconstruction and enforce the gendered and racial
norms so essential to white supremacy. 133 This effort focused chiefly
on overt signs of male privilege and citizenship, particularly the
rights to vote and to keep and bear arms.
As a result, the Klan placed Black suffrage and Black militias in
its crosshairs through campaigns to topple Republican leaders in the
South, end Reconstruction, and reestablish the former white male
planter class as the rightful leaders they believed themselves to be.
President Grant stated as much in a message to the House of
Representatives in 1872. Submitting a report on the wave of violence
in South Carolina, the President stated that the Klan's purposes
were:
by force and terror to prevent all political action not in accord
with the views of the members; to deprive colored citizens of
the right to bear arms and of the right to a free ballot. . .
these combinations were organized and armed, and had

130. Id. at 40.
131. Cardyn, supra not.e 82, at 781.
132. Id. at 695. See also id. at 815 (discussing the growing fear of the loss of
masculinity).
133. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra not.e 83, at 199 (observing that whit.e men took
the law into their own hands, which "reinforced their place within this hierarchy, as
those who embodied public power and controlled the rules to which others were
subject'); see also Jane Dailey, Deference and Violence in the Post-Bellum Urban
South: Manners and Massacres in Danville, Virginia, 63 J.S. HIST. 553, 573 (1997)
(citing white discomfort with and rejection of African American "appropriation of
Victorian gender roles"in part because "it reflected black men's new identities as
patriarchs and citizens").
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rendered the local laws ineffectual to protect the classes
whom they desired to oppress.134
For example, the day after South Carolina Governor Scott was
reelected in 1870, whites organized to disarm the Black militia,
starting in Laurens County, in the northwestern part of the state. 135
Violence spread to three neighboring counties, resulting in
"approximately 500 outrages ... committed [including] the murders
of . . . the only Negro magistrate appointed in Spartanburg. . . .
Supporters of the Radicals were attacked for a variety of
reasons .... [such as being a Democratic supporter but] accept[ing]
a Republican appointment."136 Political outcomes not to the Klan's
liking thus sparked deadly backlash.
Beyond election outcomes, however, the mere fact that Blacks
were permitted to be armed and to vote was particularly outrageous
to Klan members because these activities undermined the pre
existing racial and gender hierarchy. As Cardyn observed: "Not only
were these enterprises seen as integral complements of manhood,
but their rigid circumscription under the regime of racial slavery
rendered them badges of whiteness as well .... [thus], 'the value of
white skin dropped when black skin ceased to signify slave
status. "'137 As such, disarming the Black militia was essential to
restoring the social meaning of whiteness, and in so doing, re
establishing the constructs of citizenship and masculinity as the
preserves of white men.
Race and gender were not only at the roots of assaults upon
freedmen and Reconstruction, they also were manifested in the
punishment Klan members meted out. For example, the Klan
whipped a North Carolina freedman for supporting radical
(Republican) politicians and told him they "would show [him] how to
be a man." 138 In another incident, Klan members warned a white

134.

Ulysses S. Grant, Letter to House of Representatives, (April 19, 1872) in

MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, VOL. VII, 164 (J.D. Richardson ed.,

1898).
135. Shapiro, supra note 112, at 41.
136. Id.
137. Cardyn, supra note 82, at 817, (quoting Eva Saks, Representing
Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN 39, 47 (1988)).
138. Cardyn, supra note 82, at 778 n.409 (quoting Trial of William W. Holden,
Governor of North Carolina, Before the Senate of North Carolina, on Impeachment
by the House of Representatives for High Crimes and Misdemeanors 1763 (Raleigh
Sentinel 1871)).
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woman that they would "slit her husband's throat if he didn't
'change his politics and be a white man."'139
Black women risked retribution if they tried to politically
influence their husbands or other men in their lives. For example,
some Black women refused to sleep with husbands who were
thinking of voting for a Democrat.140 Others physically assaulted
Black men who identified with the Democratic Party by jumping on
them and tearing at their clothes. 141 Congressional hearings on Klan
violence revealed that such actions came at a cost. For example, one
witness testified that "women were whipped in every case, with the
exception of one, [when] the man of the house voted for the
republican ticket."142 Similarly, a freedwoman testified that
"[K]lansmen sought revenge not only on the men who voted
Republican but also 'took the spite out on the women when they
could get at them."143 In this regard, Black women and their
husbands were punished for transgressing gender norms. Seeking to
sway their husbands' votes signified intrusion over the patriarchal
privilege of voting and, therefore, venturing into the public realm
the male sphere. W. Scott Poole notes that in the public mind,
"African American women became symbolic counterpoints to the
purity of white southern womanhood," the antithesis of "southern
lad[ies]."144
Klan punishments also had sexual dimensions designed to
reinforce hegemonic masculinity and white supremacy. For example,
the Klan whipped men and women alike, and ordered them to
perform simulated sexual acts, or withstand assaults on their
genitals.145 Similarly, such penalties as requiring a pregnant woman

Id. at 779 n.409.
W. Scott Poole, Religion, Gender, and the Lost Cause in &uth Carolina's
1876 Governor's Race: "Hampton or Hell!, ''68 J.S. HIST. 573, 594 (2002).
141. Id.
142. Cardyn, supra note 82, at 779 (quoting 2 JOINT SELECT COMM. ON
CONDITIONS OF AFFAIRS IN THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES, 42D CONG., REPORT
OF THE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN
THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES, NORTH CAROLINA, at 195-196 (Washington
D.C., Government Printing Office 1872)).
143. Id. at n. 411 (quoting 3 JOINT SELECT COMM. ON CONDITIONS OF AFFAIRS IN
THE LATE INSURRECTIONARY STATES, 42D CONG., REPORT OF THE JOINT SELECT
COMMITTEE TO INQUIRE INTO THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN THE LATE
INSURRECTIONARY STATES, SOUTH CAROLINA, pt. 1, at 586 (Washington, D.C.,
Government Printing Office 1872)).
144. Poole, supra note 140, at 594.
145. Cardyn, supra note 82, at 707-08.
139.
140.
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to dance naked as her husband stood by powerless, 146 forcing
husbands to witness their wives being raped, 147 or, at the most
extreme level, castrating lynched freedmen, 148 brutally underscored
that, in the eyes of the Klan, access to "true" masculinity resided
with whites alone.
C. Bullets, Ballots, and Reconstruction's End: South Carolina's

Example
By 1876, Reconstruction was faltering for a variety of reasons,
not the least of which was unremitting violent resistance from the
Klan and its allies. Nationally, the country was experiencing an
economic downturn. 149 Northerners had grown weary of reports of
Southern political violence: "The whole public are tired out with
these annual autumnal outbreaks in the South ... [and] are ready
now to condemn any interference on the part of the Government."150
In this environment, the President and lawmakers calculated that
increased enforcement would come at great political expense to
Republicans; as a result, the federal government deployed
diminishing numbers of troops to the South. 151 This reduction was
especially problematic given the fact that 1876 was a Presidential
election year. 152 With federal support for enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments on the wane, opponents amplified their
virulent opposition to Black national citizenship.153
The Hamburg Massacre, which began in South Carolina on the
nation's centennial, July 4, 1876, illustrates militia service's deep
interconnection with citizenship and masculinity and the lengths to
which southern white men would go to restore the antebellum
understanding of both. The fact that voters would choose the next
governor and President heightened the urgency with which white
men would pursue what they perceived as their lost primacy.
1. Seeds of the Hamburg Massacre

146.
147.
148.
149.
(1988).
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 706.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 752-54.
See generally ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 236-39
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id.
See generally, id. at 236-39.
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In celebration of Independence Day, Black militia soldiers
paraded down a public street in their small, predominantly African
American town, until they confronted white men who made a literal
and figurative claim on the public space African Americans
occupied.154 Thomas Butler and Henry Getzen155 used their buggy to
block the soldiers' path, claiming that the road was private property
because their wagon ''had worn the ruts along''156 it-Butler's father
later admitted that the road was, indeed, public.157 But the notion of
Black men celebrating the July 4th holiday "generated intense anger
among the whites," exacerbating existing resentment against the
Black militia. 158 Butler's father stated that whites generally '"looked
upon the [Black men] as nothing more than a parcel of men - not as
militia' ... they had 'no right to those guns."' 159 Steven Kantrowitz
suggests that their ''hostility to the militia was based . . . in former
slaveholders' expectations of personal and collective authority. They '
questioned the validity of [the militia], but their skepticism ran
much deeper. A black militia, they implied, was an oxymoron." 160
A few days later, long after the parade had dissipated, the
conflict played out in court with General M.C. Butler, a former
Confederate officer, representing the white men. 161 Butler, an
attorney and unsuccessful candidate for Lieutenant Governor six
years earlier, 162 was, according to Black residents, "one of the main

154. See Stephen Kantrowitz, One Man's Mob is Another Man's Militia: Violence,
Manhood, and Authority in Reconstruction South Carolina, in JUMPIN' J™ CROW:
SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS 67, 73 (Jane Dailey, Glenda
Elizabeth Gilmore, & Bryant Simon, eds., 2000); see also Dailey, supra note 133, at
565-66 (examining escalating confrontations between whites and African Americans
after the Civil War over public places, such as streets and sidewalks).
155. See Kantrowitz, supra note 141, at 73. A newspaper report of the time
identified the men as Robert Butler and Mr. Gottson. The Old Rebel Spirit: One Way
of Reducing the Negro Vote in the South, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1876, at 1 (hereinafter
Old Rebel Spirit).
156. Kantrowitz, supra note 154, at 74. The road was "overgrown with weeds
except in its wagon ruts." Id. at 73.
157. Id. at 74.
158. Id. at 73-74. Kantrowitz observed that "[s]uch men could hardly accept that
the revolution honored by Independence Day offered any legitimate cause for black
American celebration." Id.
159. Id. at 74 (citing U.S. Senate Misc. Doc. No. 48, 44th Cong. 2d Sess. 1:1057).
160. Id.
161. See Old Rebel Spirit, supra note 143, at 1.
162. The Meaning of Hamburg: Negro Appeal for Protection, NY TIMES, July 24,
1876, at 6.
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pillars of the Kuklux fabric in South Carolina." 163 Butler sought to
have Black militia Commander Doc Adams and other officers of the
militia arrested for "obstructing the highway." 164 When Adams did
not appear in court because he feared for his safety, 165 Butler and his
men went to neighboring communities, across state lines to Georgia,
and gathered men with the explicit purpose of disarming Adams and
the Black militia. 166 In Edgefield, the closest town, whites already
had stripped Black militia of their weapons.167 Butler's mission was
neither sponsored nor explicitly sanctioned by the state of South
Carolina. Nonetheless, Butler later claimed that he and his men had
the right to disarm the Black militia because they had "assembled
riotously, [and] were in a state of armed resistance to the laws."168 In
the eyes of these white civilians, the Black militia's legal actions
were transgressions ranging from trespassing to illegal possession of
firearms and rioting, which, in turn authorized them to act in the
interest of "self-preservation."169 More likely, however, these whites
saw armed Black men as affronts to their position at the top of the
racial and gender hierarchy; in this sense, they embodied Justice
Taney's charge in Dred Scott that African American citizenship in
fomented "discontent" and was dangerous to the state's "peace and
safety."170 The Black militia troops, in defending themselves, were
also asserting their status as male citizens of this nation.
2. The Massacre's Purpose: Dismantling Black Citizenship and
Masculinity
As the posse grew, Doc Adams and the militia barricaded
themselves in the armory which stored their firearms. 171 White town
residents had fled Hamburg, having been alerted that an armed

163. Id.
164. Democratic Campaigning: The Hamburg Massacre," N.Y. TIMES, July 16,
1876, at 7.
165. See Kantrowitz, supra note 141, at 75.
166. See Old Rebel Spirit, supra note 155, at l; see also Kantrowitz, supra note
154, at 75.
167. See, The Meaning of Hamburg: Negro Appeal for Protection, supra note 162,
at 6.
168. M.C. Butler Again: He Justifies His Course at Hamburg, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 1876, at 2.
169. Id.
170. 60 U.S. at 416-17.
171. See Old Rebel Spirit, supra note 155, at 1.
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confrontation was imminent. 17 2 At seven in the evening, after militia
members again refused to surrender their weapons, the battle
began. 173 With the shower of bullets ringing through the air, the
remaining African American residents also departed, leaving the
town to its combatants. 174 When Butler's forces-members of rifle
and sabre clubs-failed to breach the brick exterior of the armory,
some men secured a cannon from Augusta, Georgia, which "tore the
windows [of the armory] to pieces."175 As the hostilities wore on,
some militia members escaped unnoticed. 176 Others were able to flee
after trading shots with Butler's men, and reached safety. Another
soldier, Marshal James Cook, failed to escape: "[I]n an instant [he]
fell dead, his head being literally honeycombed with bullets."177 By
one o'clock the next morning, Butler's men had captured twenty-nine
militia members and several weapons. General Butler left for home,
ordering his men to jail the prisoners. Instead, the white troops
released the men, shooting them as they ran. Five Black men died. 178
Subsequently, African Americans from Charleston, South
Carolina, sought justice from the state for the Hamburg massacre.179
Their letter to Governor Chamberlain, published in the New York
Times, provided grisly details of the aftermath of the battle. They
charged that Butler's men "plunder[ed] the homes of men whom they
ha[d] just slain and chopped their flesh into mince-meat and
exhibited it to the bystanders and taunting the children of the
murdered with offers of their parents' flesh to eat...." 180 Just as the
Klan, Butler's men asserted their masculinity not only by disarming
the Black militia men, but also by invading their households and
terrorizing their children- demonstrating to those families and their
communities who the "true" men were. The Charleston residents
demanded that the Governor punish M.C. Butler, and that the
federal government:
see to it that the great principles of equal justice before the
law and equal protection under this Government be
maintained throughout this nation, so that safety to life and
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also FONER, supra not;e 149, at 240.
See, The Meaning of Hamburg, supra not;e 162, at 6.
Id.
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property, and the right to vote as conscience shall dictate to
every citizen, shall be forever secured to all throughout this
broad land. 181
Governor Chamberlain, in turn, solicited President Ulysses
Grant for federal assistance. 182 While reluctant to ascribe a racial
motive to the Butler's men, 183 the governor nonetheless concluded
that their actions "indicate[d] a purpose to deprive the militia of
their rights on account of their race or political opinions," because all
those assaulted were Black and Republican.184 Chamberlain noted
that the result of the massacre was to "cause wide-spread terror and
apprehension among the colored race and the Republicans of this
State ... [but] a feeling of triumph and political elation ... in the
minds of many of the white people and Democrats." 185 He further
observed that because race and political leanings were so
intertwined, whites, who were predominantly Democratic voters,
tended to "overlook the naked brutality of the occurrence, and seek
to find some excuse or explanation of conduct which ought to receive
only unqualified abhorrence and condemnation, followed by speedy
and adequate punishment."186 According to Chamberlain, white
indifference to this violence would only fuel additional acts of
brutality and suppress the Black vote, which was no doubt a pointed
reference to the fact that a Presidential race was approaching. 187
Federal intervention would be necessary to ensure that Black
Republicans could get to the polls and elect Grant's successor.
Chamberlain warned that Hamburg was "only the beginning of a
series of similar race and party collisions in our State, the deliberate
aim of which is . . . the political subjugation and control of this
State."188 Confronted with this threat to the republican form of
government, Chamberlain sought assurances that the federal

181. Id.
182. The Hamburg Massacre: Gov. Chamberlain's Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1876, at 5.
183. Id. The letter claimed that it was "manifestly impossible to determine with
absolute certainty the motives of those who were engaged in perpetrating the
massacre at Hamburg." Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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government would "exert itself vigorously to repress violence . . .
during the present political campaign"189 in South Carolina.
President Grant agreed that the federal government was obliged
to act under these circumstances.190 He observed first that Hamburg
was not a unique experience, stating that, "as cruel, blood-thirsty,
wanton, unprovoked, and uncalled for, as it was, [it] is only a
repetition of the course which has been pursued in other Southern
States within the last few years."191 Pledging to take all actions
within his authority under law and the Constitution, the President
stated that:
A government that cannot give protection to life, property,
and all guaranteed civil rights (in this country the greatest is
an untrammeled ballot) to the citizen is, in so far, a failure,
and every energy of the oppressed should be exerted, always
within the law and by constitutional means, to regain lost
privileges and protections. 192
Three months after the massacre, Governor Chamberlain
disbanded the rifle clubs from whose ranks the Hamburg assailants
came. 193 President Grant issued a proclamation supporting the
governor's action. 194 However, neither M.C. Butler nor the men who
attacked the Hamburg militia were ever punished.195
3. Significance of the Hamburg Massacre

From start to finish, the Hamburg Massacre illustrates the social
meaning of the Second Amendment to the nation's racial and gender
189. Id.
190. See Letter from illysses S. Grant to D.H. Chamberlain, Governor of South
Carolina (July 26, 1876), available at teachingamericanhistory.org/library/letter-to-d
h-chamberlain-governor-of-south-carolina/.
191. Id. Grant pointed specifically to Louisiana and Mississippi, noting that the
latter was "governed to-day by officials chosen through fraud and violence, such as
would scarcely be accredited to savages, much less to a civilized and Christian
people." Id.
192. Id.
193. Poole, supra note 140, at 588.
194. Id. at 593.
195. In fact, South Carolina lawmakers elected Butler to the U.S. Senate in
1877. Eric Foner has suggested the Hamburg Massacre demonstrated that even the
South's elites endorsed violence as a way of reclaiming the antebellum status quo;
indeed, after Hamburg, whites reportedly declared ''This is the beginning of the
redemption of the South." FONER, supra note 149, at 240.
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hierarchy. Black militia soldiers celebrating Independence Day
flouted white notions of citizenship, masculinity, as well as nation.
By impeding the militia's parade, Butler and Getzen took a stand
against this literal and figurative move into the public arena by
claiming the street as "their" property. Instead of ceding ground to
white men upon demand, the Black militia soldiers defended
themselves, their arms, and, in doing so, their status as Americans.
The Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments had made them free
men, citizens, and voters, which in turn gave them access to the
public sphere. However, their assailants sought to return them to
slavery or something akin to it to reinstate white patriarchy. In this
regard, disarming the Black militia was tantamount to putting
African Americans in their proper place: subordinate, dependent,
and outside the realm of citizenship. To justify these actions, Butler
claimed that the armed Black militia per se contravened the law and
undermined public safety. 196 However, in truth, the Black militia
undermined the stratification upon which the South depended for its
economy-i.e., a system in which Blacks remained subservient and
underpaid-by challenging white supremacy.
As Hamburg crystallizes, white attempts to disarm Blacks were
about reifying white supremacy and patriarchy. The Klan and its
sympathizers, as much as African Americans, recognized that the
right to keep and bear arms was integral to reconstructing an
inclusive and revolutionary understanding of citizen and nation.
Hamburg is just one vivid example of how threatening that vision
was for many white Southerners, such that they engaged in armed
rebellions to return to the antebellum era. Sadly, by 1876, the
frequency of such outrages, in addition to limited financial and
military resources depleted by economic woes and constrained
emotional resources after twenty-plus years of struggling with the
South over slavery and issues of race, meant that Reconstruction
was on its last legs.197 In the razor thin election between Republican
Rutherford Hayes and Democrat Samuel Tilden, the party of Lincoln
agreed to a compromise that withdrew federal troops from the South
to enable Hayes to take the White House. 198 With that deal, the M.C.
Butlers of the South essentially prevailed.

196.
197.
198.

Kantrowitz, supra note 154, at 73-74 and accompanying text.
FONER, supra note 149, at 227, 233-34, 245.
Id. at 245.
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IV. WHAT SJF METHODS MEAN FOR THE SECOND AMENDMENT
As the foregoing demonstrates, SJF reveals that the Second
Amendment has long played a role in establishing and supporting
the interlocking oppressions of race and gender subordination. The
Supreme Court's shallow historical analysis in Heller and McDonald
completely ignores this aspect of the right to keep and bear arms,
much as its textual analysis ignored the meanings of the "people"
and "militia." At ratification, the right to keep and bear arms helped
construct notions of citizenship, race, and gender. Reconstruction
challenged those notions, but ultimately failed to dismantle them in
the face of white terroristic resistance. Indeed, the hostilities
sparked by Reconstruction illustrate that the right to keep and bear
arms was integral to white hegemonic masculinity. Against this
backdrop, the right to "self-defense" carries a meaning that extend$
beyond the individual right the Court found in Heller and McDonald.
SJF demonstrates that rather than encompassing merely the
patriarchal norms of defending family, home, and hearth, the Second
Amendment is a bulwark for the citizen-self, which as the foregoing
suggests, also has racial implications. The right to keep and bear
arms has served as both a gatekeeper to and symbol of securing that
status. The Court's historical narrative turned a blind eye to this
part of the Amendment's story. In doing so, the Court protected
white patriarchal norms, and as a consequence, reinforced
longstanding racialized and gendered subordination connected to
gun ownership and use, as illustrated by Stand Your Ground
legislation.

A. Constructing Citizen, Race, and Gender
During the time periods upon which the Court focused in Heller
and McDonald, the Amendment played a critical role in establishing
citizenship, as well as constructing race and gender, as discussed
above. At the Founding, the Amendment helped define "citizen" as
white and male, in part by limiting guns and militia service to that
class.199 In doing so, it also helped formulate our understanding of
race and gender.
Namely, the very inaccessibility of the right to keep and bear
arms for Black and Native men distinguished them from their white
counterparts. Instead of participating in public life through militia
service, men of color were relegated to domestic service, as reflected

199.

Supra Part II. B
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in statutes constraining their militia activities to attending to or
entertaining white men.200 In this way, excluding men of color from
the Second Amendment's orbit established Black and Native men's
status as non-white and non-male. Pushed to the sidelines as
incapable of defending the state, these men were consigned to the
domestic sphere as dependents, in the same category as women and
children.
Reconstruction both challenged and highlighted these
conceptions of race and gender, particularly for Blacks. By lifting the
barriers to citizenship formerly enshrined in the Constitution, the
Reconstruction Amendments and their implementing legislation
equalized Black men with their white counterparts on paper.
Equipped with the rights to vote, keep and bear arms, and serve in
the militia, Black men were authorized to participate in civic life. By
law, they could be paid for their labor and oversee their own
households. Autonomous and freed from the domestic sphere, Black
men no longer were feminized. These changes upended the social
order.
For white southern men, the liberty afforded to Black men
undermined their primacy at home and in society. Reconstruction
thus revealed masculinity and whiteness to be contingent and
malleable, which added to the destabilizing effects of the legal
framework dismantling the slavery regime. White southerners thus
brutally repudiated Reconstruction in order to reestablish the racial
and gender social order, placing themselves at the top.

B. Self-Defense as Identity Protection
In this regard, SJF reveals that the Second Amendment right to
self-defense plays a structural role in society. Here, the
Reconstruction history is telling. For white Southerners, new laws
welcoming Black men into citizenship threatened a nation whites
had long believed was established by and for them. Black men as
citizens per se jeopardized that notion, as well as the security it
provided the white nation, which Justice Taney averred that the
framers intended to create. 201 Thus, when confronted with Black
militia men, white Southerners claimed self-defense to justify
disarming them. In this sense, they defended the self implicit in the
antebellum concept of nation, which by definition excluded Blacks.
Similarly, freedmen resisted attacks by hate groups to protect the

200.
201.

HENNING, supra now 60 and accompanying wxt.
Scott, 60 U.S. at 416-17. See also supra now 75 and accompanying wxt.
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newly enfranchised and legitimized citizen self. The Hamburg
Massacre illustrated how deeply at odds these dueling visions of
nation were, and the barbarous lengths to which white Southern
men would go to restore the antebellum racial and gender hierarchy.

C. Heller and McDonald: Using History to Reinforce Subordination
The Court used a selective historical narrative to ascertain the
Second Amendment's meaning. The story it told, to quote historian
Robert W. Gordon, "relegate[d] the bad parts of history, the parts we
no longer want or need-the past of slavery and legalized
subordination of women, for example-to a thoroughly dead past
that is over and done with." 202 The Court's textual and historical
analysis of the Amendment erred significantly in failing to consider
what the terms "militia" or "people" meant for African Americans or
women at the founding in its examination of the "prefatory" and
"operative" clauses. 203 Doing so would have provided a more
comprehensive understanding of the right. The Court ignored this
history, presumably because it deemed such facts as irrelevant for
ascertaining the present-day significance of the right, or perhaps
because it did not support the "single authoritative meaning'' it
sought to articulate.204 Whatever the reason, as the foregoing
indicates, racial and gender norms were implicit in the Second
Amendment at Ratification and Reconstruction, which means the
framers knew whom the provision was meant to protect and whom it
was meant to exclude. The Court's neglect of the subordinating
structures embedded in the Amendment means its holding
particularly when considered in tandem with dicta "elevating"205 the
right-guarantee that the subjugating aspects of the right to keep
and bear arms will continue, albeit in a different form in what Reva
Siegel has identified as "preservation-through-transformation."206

202. Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1023, 1028 (1997).
203. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 578. Gordon provides an illuminating example:
"'[l]iberty' in the eighteenth century presupposed a world in which slaves or
indentured or household servants and women would perform the menial tasks that
freed gentleman for participation in politics or the pursuit of new economic
opportunities; a liberty of the few premised on the subordination of the many."
Gordon, supra note 202, at 1025.
204. Id.
205. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
206. Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love':· Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy,
105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118-19 (1996).
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Specifically, in elevating the right to self-defense above all other
interests, the Court has reified the white patriarchal structure the
Second Amendment long has supported, as current laws suggest.
Consider so-called Stand Your Ground (SYG) measures. Thirty-three
states have such laws, which allow a person to use deadly force in
self-defense at home or in public (in Florida, for example, any place
one has a right to be), with no duty to retreat.207 Many of these
jurisdictions also provide immunity to persons asserting SYG, which
frees them from arrest or prosecution. 2os An American Bar
Association (ABA) task force found that SYG laws have resulted in
significant racial disparities; for example, nationally, "a white
shooter who kills a black victim is 350 percent more likely to be
found to be justified than if the same shooter killed a white
victim."209 It also found significant discrepancies in case outcomes,
even when the facts were similar. 210
The cases of George Zimmerman and Marissa Alexander, Florida
residents who sought refuge from SYG laws in highly publicized
incidents, are useful examples. George Zimmerman shot and killed
Trayvon Martin, an unarmed Black teenager, in February of 2012. 211
Police failed to arrest Zimmerman at the scene because he told
officers that he acted in self-defense; accordingly, by statute, the
officers used their discretion to release him, uncharged. 212 In the
wake of public outrage, police later arrested Zimmerman. A jury
ultimately acquitted him of second degree murder because SYG
''language was . . . used in the instructions to the jury."213 In
contrast, the same year a jury convicted Marissa Alexander, an
African American woman, and sentenced her to 20 years for firing a
warning shot in the air out of fear of imminent abuse from her
partner, who walked away unharmed.214 The court denied Ms.

207. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION, NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR
GROUND LAWS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Sept. 2015). See also
Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense,
86 MARQ. L. REV. 653, 663 (2003) (commenting on how SYG laws reflect the current
state of the law respecting self-defense: most jurisdictions do not impose a duty to
retreat).
208. ABA REPORT at 22.
209. Id. at 25.
210. Id. at 14.
211. Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your
Ground, Battered Women's Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAM1 L.
REV. 1099, 1116-17 (2014).
212. Id. at 1117.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1118-19. Alexander's partner admitted to abusing women as a
relationship strategy:
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Alexander's attempt to assert SYG, which a court of appeals
a:ffirmed. 21 5 SYG, an extension of the so-called "castle doctrine,"2 16
was unavailable to Ms. Alexander. This doctrine allows a person to
use deadly force to protect herself against an intruder or even a
guest who becomes violent. However, when a cohabitant is the
aggressor, the law imposes a duty to retreat because both parties
''ha[ve] an equal right to be in the castle."211 Thus, because Ms.
Alexander lived with her abuser, she had a limited right to stand her
ground, even though she was in danger.
The different results in the Alexander and Zimmerman cases
show that SYG and its close relative, the castle doctrine, protect a
racialized and gendered self. Zimmerman successfully deployed SYG
to excuse his shooting of a Black male teenager armed only with
Skittles and bottled iced tea. Race and gender combined to construct
Martin as threatening to Zimmerman, a common manifestation of
implicit bias. 21 8 In the home, however, SYG and the castle doctrine
protected the functional or titular head of household, even when he
was abusive and posed an actual, demonstrated threat to his
cohabitant. The patriarchal norm of family thus is a barrier to
prosecution under the SYG regime. In this regard, rather than
serving as a tool for autonomy as Heller and McDonald suggest and

'I got five baby mammas and I put my hands on every last one of them
except for one .... I physically abused them; physically, emotionally, you
know.... Me, the way I was with women, they was like they had to walk
on eggshells around me. You know they never knew what I was thinking,
what I might say. . . . Or what I might do.' He also stated that he told
Alexander that 'if she ever cheated on him, he would kill her.'

Id.
215. Alexander v. State, 121 So. 3d 1185, 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). The
appeals court ordered a new trial. Id. The court reversed Alexander's conviction for
aggravated battery on grounds that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
self-defense, but affirmed denial of immunity under the SYG statute. Id. at 1187. Ms.
Alexander subsequently pled guilty to assault and has been released from jail. See
lrin Carmon, Marissa Alexander Released from Jail, MSNBC (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/marissa-alexander-may-be-released.
216. Franks, supra note 210, at 1110.
217. Carpenter, supra note 206, at 679.
218. ABAREPORT, supra note 217, at 24. The ABA heard evidence from experts
as to the prevalence of implicit bias and its implications for SYG. For example, Dr.
Jennifer Eberhart reported on research demonstrating that "people were quicker to
shoot black men with guns than white men with guns, and if there existed any
doubt, would shoot a black person with no gun over a white man with no gun." Id.
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some gun rights advocates assert, SYG more precisely is about
protecting the white patriarchal self.
CONCLUSION

When viewed through a feminist lens, the Second Amendment is
less an instrument for protecting individual rights than a component of
a legislative, political, and social framework to protect and advance
white patriarchy. The SJF methods applied above shed light on history
lost to or ignored by the Court of the purposefulexclusion of persons
from the category of citizen based on race and gender. Congress's
actions during the Reconstruction period only amplify that
understanding, as lawmakers passed measures to correct that past.
Specifically, through Constitutional amendments and implementing
legislation, the former enslaved at last were deemed citizens and part of
the nation. Black men could vote and serve in militias as armed
soldiers, which further afforded them the mantle of manhood that the
antebellum regime denied. However, this seismic shift to the social
order ignited violence in much of the South, as white males sought to
retain their primacy in the social order.
The battles of this period underscored the great significance of
keeping and bearing arms, as a matter of race and gender. For
white men participating in the Klan's campaign of terror to re
enslave African Americans, arming themselves was essential to
repudiate Black progress and the threat it presented to their vision
of a white America. For Black men, firearm ownership signified
their accession to masculinity and citizenship, and was essential to
defend that new status. At stake then, was nothing less than the
social meaning of nation. The Supreme Court's focus on individual
rights to self-defense elided this critical aspect of the Amendment's
past, resulting in a holding that reinforced systemic racial and
gender subordination by privileging self-defense over other interests.
In so doing, it affirmed the Amendment's oppressive ends, recasting
them in the guise of individual rights.
This understanding of the racialized and gendered aspects of the
Second Amendment provides new tools for analyzing gun
regulations. At a minimum, it suggests that the right should be
considered against state interests in eradicating systemic race and
gender bias, which are evident in so-called Stand Your Ground laws,
for example. It is my hope that this article invites additional
feminist exploration of gun regulation. As the death toll continues to
rise due to accidental and intentional shootings, the more thinking
we can bring to bear on this issue, the better.

